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APPELLANTS'REPLY
INTRODUCTION
The district court committed error in concluding the published accusation by the Halls that
Dennis and Wanda Irish were stalking them was an opinion. Contrary to the assertions made by
the Halls in their response, the statement "Dennis and Wanda Irish stocking U2" was not "merely
an opinion" or "hyperbole and colloquial speech." This statement followed dismissal of a criminal
charge accusing Dennis Irish of stalking Dona Hall. The published statement was an allegation by
the Halls that the Irishes were engaged in criminal activity. As such, it was defamation per se. A
reasonable jury could have concluded based on the language of the statement, read in the context
of the situation at hand, that the communicated statement was defamatory in nature. Therefore, the
district court erred in directing verdict against the Irishes because it failed to draw every legitimate
inference in favor of the Irishes as required.

LEGAL STANDARD
Revisiting the standard previously discussed by the Irishes and the Halls in their prior
briefs, a defamation action requires proof of the following elements: (1) communication of
information concerning the plaintiff to others; (2) the information was defamatory, and (3) the
plaintiff was damaged because of the communication. Clarkv. Spokesman-Review, 144 Idaho 427,
430, 163 P.3d 216, 219 (2007). These are the elements which must be proven by the typical person
claiming defamation, including Dennis Irish.
Public figures, like Wanda Irish, must prove an additional element of malice on the part of
the speaker. Id. ("[I]fthe plaintiff is a public figure, the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964), standard applies, and the plaintiff can recover only if
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he can prove actual malice, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth, by clear and
convincing evidence.").
In Clark, this Court explained malice regarding defamation of public figures:
Actual malice is not defined as an evil intent or a motive arising from spite. In a
defamation action, actual malice is knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of
truth. Mere negligence is insufficient; the plaintiff must demonstrate that the author
in fact ente1iained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication or acted with a
high degree of awareness of probable falsity. The standard of actual malice is a
subjective one. However, although actual malice is a subjective standard, selfinterested denials of actual malice from the defendant can be rebutted with other
evidence.

Id. at 431, 163 P.3d at 220.
A charge of defamation comes down to the truth of the statements alleged as defamatory.
See Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 138 Idaho 249,253, 61 P.3d 606, 610 (2002). "In determining

the defamatory character of a publication [the miicle] must be read and construed as a whole; the
words used are to be given their common and usually accepted meaning and are to be read and
interpreted as they would be read and understood by the persons to whom they are published."
Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 75 Idaho 502, 508, 275 P.2d 663, 666 (1954). Some statements are

so injurious to a person's reputation that they can be defamatory per se. See Weeks v. M-P
Publications, 95 Idaho 634,636,516 P.2d 193, 195 (1973). "[I]fthe language used is plain and

unambiguous, it is a question of law for the comi to determine whether it is libelous per se,
otherwise it is a question of fact for the trier of fact." Id. This Comi further explained what
statements rise to level of libelous per se in Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co.:
In order to be libelous per se, the defamatory words must be of such a nature that
the court can presume as a matter oflaw that they will tend to disgrace and degrade
the person or hold him up to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule or cause him to be
shunned and avoided; in other words, they must reflect on his integrity, his
character, and his good name and standing in the community, and tend to expose
him to public hatred, contempt or disgrace. The imputation must be one which tends
to affect plaintiff in a class of society whose standard of opinion the court can
2

recognize. It is not sufficient, standing alone, that the language is unpleasant and
annoys or irks plaintiff, and subject (sic) him to jests or banter, so as to affect his
feelings.
Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 73 Idaho 173, 179, 249 P.2d 192, 195 (1952).

With this, if a statement is one that "impute[s] conduct constituting a criminal offense
chargeable by indictment or by information either at common law or by statute and such kind as
to involve infamous punishment [death or imprisonment] or moral turpitude conveying the idea of
major social disgrace" it is defamatory per se, "that is, actionable without allegation and proof of
special damages .... " Barlow v. Int'! Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 890, 522 P.2d 1102, 1111
(1974).
ARGUMENT

I.

The district court erred as a matter of law in holding the publication "Dennis and
Wanda Irish stocking [stalking] U2 [you too]" was merely an opinion.

The first element of defamation considered by the trial court was whether the Halls
co111111unicated information concerning the Irishes to others. The district court held that the wi-fi
access designation met the definition of a publication to others because it was picked up by all
devices with wireless capabilities within range of the signal, including cellular phones. The Halls
dispute this holding in their response on appeal, which is discussed later in this reply.
The Halls do not dispute they created the wi-fi beam "Dennis & Wanda h'ish stocking
U2". 1 The Halls assert even if this signal was a communication as required by the defamation
elements, the district court's holding was con·ect because the statement was an "opinion and
protected by the First Amendment." Respondent's Brief, p. 12 (Sept. 21, 2017). They further assert
that "the Halls have a constitutionally protected right to criticize the mayor." Id.
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Tr. Vol. I, p. 157, 1. 24 -p. 158, 1. 18, Trial Exhibit 6.
3

While it is true that the Halls have the right to hold any opinion about the Irishes they wish
to have, and a right to criticize the mayor as a public official which does not extend to Dennis Irish,
once the Halls published accusations that Dennis and Wanda Irish were engaged in criminal
activity, the Halls' privately-held opinion lost its status as a protected opinion. Once one publishes
a communication that another has committed a crime to the world at large, it is defamation per se
unless it is true. Interspersing the accusation with acronyms and intentional or unintentional
misspellings does not change the nature of the accusation although the acronyms and misspellings
may cause the statement to no longer be plain and unambiguous, thus creating a question of fact
for the trier of fact.
Stalking is a crime in Idaho, carrying a penalty which can include imprisonment for up to
five ye11rs, depending on the degree. I.C. § 18-7905. A reasonable jury could have found the Halls
accused both Irishes of stalking, a criminal offense chargeable by information or indictment and
punishable by imprisonment. Thus, a reasonable jury could have found the allegation was
defamatory per se. See Barlow v. Int'l Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 552 P.2d 1102 (1974)
(affirming that oral statements alleging a business owner was a liar and thief were slanderous per
se).
The Halls fmiher asse1i that their communication accusing the Irishes of stalking was
"hyperbole," citing Weeks v. M-P Publications, Inc. for suppmi. Weeks involved an editorial article
published in a weekly newspaper in Jerome, Idaho which accused the city council members of
being "teeny tyrants" and "these three stooges." Weeks, 95 Idaho at 636, 516 P.2d at 195. These
statements against the city council members were not accusations of criminal conduct, but rather
editorial musings of disgruntled constituents. The Comi in Weeks properly held such statements

4

were "nothing more than hardy, uninhibited statements" about the actions of public officials and
therefore were not libelous per se. Id. at 639,516 P.2d at 198.
The statement "Dennis and Wanda Irish stocking U2" is not merely "ribald or robust
criticism" of Wanda Irish' s political decisions. Rather, a reasonable jury could find this statement,
communicated to all who viewed the Halls' wi-fi beacon, accused both Irishes of serious criminal
activity, an accusation which caused members of the community to question Wanda Irish about
the statements made via the wi-fi beam. Tr. Vol. I, p. 142, 1.8-p. 143, 1. 6.
Further, the Halls' accusation was not "colloquial speech," as asserted by the Halls.
Colloquial speech includes slang and expressions that are used in everyday, informal conversation.
As the Halls aptly describe, the plu-ase "You're killing me!" is an example of a colloquialism, by
which it is not meant that a person is literally committing a homicide. However, contrary to the
Halls' assertions, the phrase "stalking you too" does not share the same colloquial status. The
phrase "Dennis and Wanda Irish stocking U2" could be found by a reasonable jury to be an
asse1tion by the Halls that each of the Irishes was engaged separately or together in the criminal
activity of stalking them.
A directed verdict is proper "only where the evidence is so clear that all reasonable minds
would reach only one conclusion: that the moving pmty should prevail." Sheridan v. St. Luke's
Regional Medical Center, 135 Idaho 775, 785, 25 P.3d 88, 98 (2001) (quoting Student Loan Fund
of Idaho, Inc. v. Duerner, 131 Idaho 45, 51,951 P.2d 1272, 1278 (1997)). Even though stalking

was misspelled, and the statement used slang for "you too," the jury could have reasonably
determined, based on the context of the statements, the overwhelming histo1y of contentious
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dispute hetween the parties, the size of the community 2 and the previous criminal charges of
stalking brought against Dennis Irish by Dona Hall that the statement was intended to accuse the
Irishes of criminal activity. As the court has recognized in Barlow v. Int 'l Harvester Co., supra, a
statement "imput[ing] conduct constituting a criminal offense chargeable by indictment or by
information either at common law or by statute and such kind as to involve infamous punishment
[death or imprisonment] or moral turpitude conveying the idea of major social disgrace" is
defamatory per se, "without allegation and proof of special damages." Barlow, 95 Idaho at 890,
522 P .2d at 1111. A reasonable jury could have found this statement was defamatory per se and
the district court's grant of directed verdict against the Irishes was error.

II. The district court's did not commit error when it held that the Halls' statement was
published and communicated to third persons.
As stated above, the first element that the trial comt discussed in her oral ruling was
whether the Halls communicated information concerning the Irishes to others. This is a required
element in a defamation claim.
HatTison is a very small community of approximately 200 people. Tr. Vol. I, p. 14, 11. 2021. Its main gathering places are the post office and the grocery store. Tr. Vol I, p. 181, 11. 4-5.
The Halls contend the trial comt's holding that the wi-fi beam was a publication was wrong
because no member of the community testified, and Wanda Irish only saw the wi-fi beam while at
her home. This argument ignores Wanda Irish' s testimony that people within the community had
approached her and inquired about the accusation made via the wi-fi beam accusing her and her
husband of stalking. Tr. Vol. I, p. 142, I. 8 -p. 143, 1. 6.
As the trial court aptly stated:

Harrison is a small city with a population of approximately two hundred (200) citizens. Tr.
Vol. I, p. 142, 11. 20-21.

2
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There is evidence that these statements were seen by others, based on not
only the Irishes testifying that people ask them about it, but as far as the
court is concerned, when I open up my phone and turn to certain
applications ... always a screen pops up saying do you want to connect to
this Wi-Fi, this one, this one, this one, or this one. It's that same kind of
thing. People would have seen that, there is no question in the comi's mind
that that would have been obvious to others .... what other purpose would
there be to name your Wi-Fi beacon Wanda Irish- or Mayor Irish terrorist
or Mayor Irish lied, other than to communicate those words?
Tr. Vol. II, p. 227, I. 22- p. 228, I. 8; p. 205, I. 20-23.
On the issue of communication of the wi-fi beacon to third parties, the trial comi cotTectly
analyzed the evidence in the light most favorable to the Irishes, as required under a motion for
directed verdict. The trial court did not, as the Hall assert, presume an element of the case. There
was sufficient admissible evidence, including the testimony of Wanda Irish, for a reasonable jury
to find the element of publication was met. The district judge did not err in viewing this element
in the light most favorable to the Irishes in deciding the directed verdict.
. III. Wanda Irish presented sufficient evidence upon which a jury could find the
additional element of malice required for defamation of public figures.

As discussed above, public figures claiming defamation, like Wanda Irish, must prove an
additional element of malice on the pmi of the speaker. Malice is "knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard oftrnth." Clark v. Spokesman-Review, 144 Idaho 427,431, 163 P.3d 216,220 (2007).
The standard for showing malice is clear and convincing evidence. Id.
The evidence showed the Halls previously filed a criminal compl'aint against Dennis Irish
which resulted in a charge against Dennis Irish for stalking Dona Hall, which was dismissed by
the prosecutor after discussing the facts with Dennis Irish for approximately ten (10) minutes. Tr.
Vol. I, p. 130, I. 1-25. Additionally, the Halls received two written warnings from the Irishes'
attorney to cease harassing the Irishes. Tr. Vol. I, p. 152, I. 8, - p. 153, I. 4, Trial Exhibit 4.
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The Halls again claimed Dennis Irish was stalking Dona Hall after the criminal charges
were dismissed. Tr. Vol. I, p. 158, l. 19 - p. 159, l. 20. The second act of stalking which Dennis
Irish allegedly engaged in comprised being a passenger in a car traveling on a public road to make
a call on a client, and encountering Dona Hall standing in the middle of the road visiting with
another person. Tr. Vol. I, p. 178, l. 21 - p. 180, l. 12. Wanda Irish was not even present. Dona
Hall called Wanda Irish at city hall alleging Dennis Irish was stalking her because he had gone by
her house while she was there. Tr. Vol. I, p. 158, l. 19- p. 159, l. 19. Wanda Irish informed Dona
Hall that De1mis Irish was going to see a client. Id. After that, both Halls wentto the city hall to
confront Wanda Irish and accuse Dennis Irish of stalking Dona Hall. Id. Thereafter, the Halls
beacon designation was changed to "Dennis and Wanda Irish stocking U2". Id.
The Halls admitted in their answer the wi-fi beams (a set accusing Wanda Irish of being a
terrorist and the wi-fi beam accusing the lrishes of stalking them) were created by them. Jeffrey
Hall admitted to Wanda Irish that the wi-fi beams were childish. Tr. Vol. I, p. 150, l. 13-p.151, 1.

4.
Wanda Irish was not even present at the alleged "stalking incident" raised by the Halls to
her shortly before the creation of the wi-fi beacon. A trier of fact could have viewed this testimony
combined with the testimony of the long and acrimonious relationship between the Halls and the
Irishes, to reach a conclusion that the Halls acted with knowledge of the falsity of their claim that
Wanda Irish had stalked them, or reckless disregard of truth. The jury could also have viewed the
testimony of the long and acrimonious relationship of the Halls with Wanda Irish and concluded
that the Halls spoke with malice in accusing Wanda Irish of stalking them.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it was improper for the district court to grant the Halls' motion for
directed verdict. The directed verdict should be reversed, and this matter should be remanded for
a trial on the merits.

CROSS-RESPONDENTS' RESPONSE TO THE CROSS-APPEAL
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Many of the statements made in the Halls' brief to this Court include allegations of fact
raised in the post-trial affidavits of Jeffrey Hall and a former deputy sheriff, Matt Edmonds. These
facts were not raised at trial and the Irishes disagree with Edmonds' characterization of the
interaction between the parties. Based upon the dismissal of the stalking charge alleged by Dona
Hall against Dem1is Irish, it appears the prosecutor also did not agree with the former deputy
sheriffs assessment of the circumstances.
In response to the facts presented in Respondent's brief to this Court, the Irishes do not
dispute that the Halls have been the owners of a private marina, Gateway Marina, for quite some
time, nor do they dispute that the Halls experienced some backlash from the community when they
purchased the marina. However, the Irishes were not a party to the backlash against the Halls; in
fact, Jeffrey Hall admits in his Affidavit in Support of Motion for Attorney's Fees, "I considered
Wanda and Dennis Irish as some of my first Idaho friends. They befriended us and I socialized
with them often in the early years of2004." R. Vol. III, p. 491.
In 2010, Wanda Irish became mayor of the City of Harrison, a role she has held ever since.
In her duties as mayor, it fell to Wanda Irish to assert use of a city easement which was granted by
the Halls' predecessors upon a portion of the Halls' real property. R. Vol. III, p. 517. This easement
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was granted for use by the public for "public parking purposes." Id. As a condition of the easement,
the City was required to "maintain the prope1ty." Id. In maintaining the property for its public
parking purpose, Mayor Irish was obligated to remove several planter boxes put in place by Jeffrey
Hall which were impeding the flow of traffic. R. Vol. III, p. 527. She only did so after Jeffrey Hall
refused her requests to relocate them. Id. Every effort was made to allow the Halls the opportunity
to remove their encroachments upon the easement without formal legal action taken against them.
When the Halls refused to cooperate with the maintenance of the easement, Mayor Irish, in her
capacity as the city's representative, was forced to file a complaint to enforce the city's easement.
R. Vol. III, pp. 508-516. This dispute between the City of Harrison and the Halls was resolved
through mediation in 2015. Mayor Irish's signing of the complaint and removal of Jeffrey Hall's
obstruction upon the easement quickly inspired a very personal and contentious attack by the Halls
against the Irishes.
The dispute between the parties was heightened after Mayor Irish called the sheriff to
address Jeffrey Hall's illegally parked truck on the easement. R. Vol. I, 17 (complaint). In
Edmonds' opinion, Jeffrey Hall's truck was not illegally parked and he refused to issue a citation
or have the ttuck towed. R. Vol. III, p. 577. The Irishes then left the state to visit some family for
the weekend. Tr. Vol. I, p. 167, 11. 12-14. While the Irishes were out of town, the campground host
had Jeffrey Hall's truck towed for being illegally parked, an event with which the Irishes were not
involved. Tr. Vol. I, p. 171, 11. 3-13.
Despite Mayor Irish's absence from the City when the Halls' ttuck was towed, Jeffrey Hall
accused Mayor Irish of towing the truck from the Halls' property. Tr. Vol. I, p. 111, 11. 1-2. In
fact, it was the campground host that towed the Halls' truck. Tr. Vol. I, p. 115, 11. 14-15. Jeffrey
Hall confronted Mayor Irish about the towing of his vehicle during a public City Council meeting.
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R. Vol. III, p. 491. Additionally, the Halls called the Irishes repeatedly, accusing the Mayor of
having his vehicle and trailer towed and using profuse profanity and vulgar language. Tr. Vol. I,
p. 110, 1. 7-p. 112, I. 8; p. 168, 11. 4-7. These calls continued until Dennis Irish answered the ninth
call and threatened to call the sheriff if the telephone harassment didn't stop. Tr. Vol. I, p. 112, 1.
9-p. 114, 1. 5; p. 182, L 9-p. 183, 1. 20. Over a significant period of time following the towing, the
Halls posted several statements throughout town accusing Mayor Irish of being a liar and a
terrorist. Tr. Vol. I, p. 117, 1. 8-21.
In 2012, in response to increased incidents of vandalism and graffiti in the city, Dennis
Irish installed a security camera system for the city. Tr. Vol. I, p. 97, 11. 15-18. The Halls
complained that these cameras were pointed at them and their properties, despite no evidence
supporting those allegations. R. Vol. III, p. 498. Dona Hall submitted several public records
requests seeking information concerning Plaintiffs private business and the location of security
cameras located on Plaintiffs private prope11y. R. Vol. I, pp. 128-53. These requests did not seek
information relating to the conduct or administration of the City of Harrison obtainable under the
Idaho Public Records Act, LC. § 74-101, et seq., and were made for an improper and harassing
purpose.
The Halls' belief that the Irishes' security cameras were spying on them led the Halls to
seek a "No Trespass" order against the Irishes from the sheriff. 3 R. Vol. III, pp. 502, 577. After
the issuance of this directive, Dennis Irish entered what he believed was public right of way and
the public parking lot, located upon the public easement. R. Vol. III, p. 502. The Halls telephoned

Jeffrey Hall's affidavit and Matthew Edmonds' affidavit discuss a "trespass order" arising from
a request that the Irishes be "trespassed" from the Halls' business. No restraining order was
issued by a court. It appears that the former deputy sheriff believed he had the power to issue an
oral order to the Irishes not to enter the Halls' property.

3
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former deputy sheriff Edmonds, who issued a citation against Dennis Irish for stalking Dona Hall
without any in-person investigation. R. Vol. II, p. 476. The stalking charge was dismissed by the
deputy prosecuting attorney after ascertaining the facts. Tr. Vol. I, p. 132, I. 7-25.
Despite the dismissal of the criminal charges against Dennis Irish, the Halls persisted in
accusing Dennis Irish of stalking Dona Hall. Tr. Vol. I, p. 158, II. 19-p. 159, I. 20. They published
a wi-fi beacon accusing both Irishes of stalking them. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 158-160.
Throughout the duration of the Halls' dispute with the Irishes, Jeffrey and Dona Hall
engaged in "reprehensible" conduct and "shameful behavior," as pointed out by the district judge.
Tr. Vol. II, p. 238, II. 5-9, 25; p. 239, I. 1 ("I think the conduct as I have heard it is reprehensible.
It's childish, it's harassment, it's ridiculous. If! were the Irishes, I would be ten-ibly, terribly upset.
I would certainly consider filing a lawsuit. It's untenable .... And Mr. Hall, I'm just - this is
shameful behavior. It really is."). Some of this "reprehensible" conduct included: Jeffrey Hall
physically pacing outside of Wanda lrish's office waiting for her to be alone and then entering her
office to yell at her alleging that she has been rmming secret meetings; Jeffrey and Dona Hall
yelling at, threatening, and ordering the Irishes, their family members, and City employees to leave
the public easement located on the Halls' property; Jeffrey Hall posting pictures of the Irishes'
boat to social media with false and malicious comments stating Wanda Irish "can do anything
because she thinks she [is] a King;" the Halls proclaiming to third parties that Wanda Irish is
"rnnning a coll'upt business" and has "corrupted the local city government by favoring her family
members;" the Halls taking photographs of the Irishes while the Irishes were on the deck of their
private home; the Halls telling Wanda Irish, when on the pnblic easement, to "get the fuck off my
prope1ty" and calling Wanda Irish "that bitch" when ordering other city employees off the public
easement; and the Halls driving their vehicles in an mmaturally slow fashion and honking their
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horn without any basis or reason to do so past the Irishes' residence to menace and intimidate
them. R. Vol. II, p. 318-19.
Shortly before trial in this matter, Jeffrey Hall came to Wanda Irish's place of work,
demanded she dismiss her case against him, and tlu·eatened to "reopen" the criminal stalking case
against Dennis Irish if she didn't. R. Vol. II, p. 420 (Declaration of Wanda Irish in Support of
Motion for Injunction).
This behavior persisted even after the directed verdict was granted, forcing Wanda Irish to
file for an injunction and protective order against the Halls pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 65(a) and
(e)(2). R. Vol. II, pp. 431--450. After trial concluded, Jeffrey Hall again came to City Hall on nongovernment business and accused the Mayor of being a liar. Id. He was instructed to direct all
communications to the Irishes through counsel. Id. Later that same day, Jeffrey Hall came to
Mayor Irish's office again, de111anded payment of his attorney fees, threatened to "have a talk with
[Mayor Irish's] husband" if she didn't write him a check that moment, and insinuated that he had
the "judge and prosecutor in his 'back pocket.'" Id. at 421. Jeffrey Hall continued to confront the
Irishes on multiple occasions thereafter, calling Mayor Irish's cell phone, leaving voice messages,
coming by her workplace, interrupting city business 111eetings, and accusing the Mayor of lying in
front of speakers and attendees at these 111eetings. Id. On one occasion, Jeff Hall's behavior turned
physically violent and he attempted to strike the Mayor in the face with his cell phone, causing
witnesses to intervene and the sheriff to be called. Id. at 423. A temporary protection order was
granted. R. Vol. II, pp. 447-50.

ST AND ARD OF REVIEW
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The decision to award or deny attorney fees to a pmiy is within the sound discretion of the
trial comi. Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 901, I 04 P.3d 367,375 (2004). Such an award or denial
is reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. Id.
Under Idaho Code § 12-121, a "judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing pmiy or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." (emphasis added).
ARGUMENT

I.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Halls' request for attorney
fees
A.

A party which prevails on a directed verdict is not automatically entitled to
an award of attorney fees

The Halls assert the grant of a directed verdict automatically establishes that the Irishes
acted unreasonably in pursuing their defamation complaint and the trial comi was required to
award them attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. The Halls cite to Anderson v. Ethington, 103
Idaho 658, 659 (1982) to support this proposition. The Anderson case was decided prior to the
enactment of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l), when the decision to award attorney fees
was col11l11itted entirely to the sound discretion of the court. That broad discretion was later limited
by passage of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) to cases which were brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
umeasonably or without foundation. Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 868, 380 P.3d 681 (2016).
The latest enactment of I.C. § 12-121 also limits the award of attorney fees where cases are
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.
The Anderson case involved a directed verdict. The issue on appeal was whether a denial
of sul11l11ary judgment against the third-party plaintiff precluded the trial comi later finding the
third-patiy plaintiffs case was brought without foundation. The Anderson comi concluded it did
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not because the standard for summary judgment was different. The Anderson court did not hold
that grant of a directed verdict mandates that a trial court must find that the plaintiffs case was
brought without foundation.

B.

The Irishes' suit was not brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation.

The Halls argue under the broader standard of Anderson that the Irishes' case was pursued
without fonndation. The Irishes' defamation claim was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation, as alleged by the Halls under the current standard. For years, the Irishes were forced
to endure the Halls' barbs, harassment and false criminal allegations, conduct by the Halls that the
district judge deemed "childish," "ridiculous," "shameful" and "reprehensible." Tr. Vol. II, p. 238,
11. 6-7, 25. In fact, the trial court itself stated: "IfI were the Irishes, I would be terribly, terribly
upset. I would certainly consider filing a lawsuit. It's untenable." Tr. Vol. II p. 238, 1. 7-9. Even
Mr. Hall admitted his behavior had been childish. R. Vol. II, p. 389.
Further, the trial court recognized "[d]efamation is a morass of gray areas" and "[t]here is
evidence that these statements were seen by others .... "Tr.Vol. II p. 22, 1. 22-23; p. 229, 1. 1415. Moreover, the trial court agreed that the Irishes' interpretation of the Halls' statement was
accusing them of stalking was a reasonable inference to draw. Tr. Vol. II p. 236, I. 16. The trial
court determined, based on the evidence, testimony, and credibility of the parties before it, that
there was no basis to award attorney's fees to the Halls, even though they were the prevailing party
on the directed verdict. The Halls have failed to show how the trial court abused its discretion in
so holding. Therefore, this Court should uphold the trial comi's denial of attorney fees to
Respondents.
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C.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to award attorney fees
based on the other grounds raised by the Halls in their cross appeal

The Halls also claim an award of attorney fees was proper because the Irishes pied multiple
causes of action which were barred by the statute of limitations, and because the Irishes requested
a jury instruction for punitive damages even though the verified complaint failed to asseti a
punitive damage claim.
The Halls request attorney fees for the Irishes' causes of action for defamatory slander
which were barred by the statutes of limitation. Contrary to the Halls assertion in their appeal,
they did not have to defend multiple counts of defamatory slander. There was only one cause of
action alleged in the verified complaint for defamatory slander and one cause of action for
injunctive relief which the Halls had to defend.
While there were many statements made by the Halls which were alleged in the facts of
the verified complaint, some of which standing alone might fall outside the statute of limitations,
this does not convert the alleged facts to separate causes of action. Many of these statements
appear to have been asserted to support the element of malice which a public figure is required to
demonsh·ate in a slander case. The trial comt directed verdict on the only count of defamatory
slander raised by the Irishes, and the directed verdict was unrelated to the statutes of limitation.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to award the Halls attorney fees as the
prevailing paiiy on non-existent multiple counts of defamatory slander.
The Halls also request attorney fees for prevailing on a non-existent punitive damage cause
of action. The Halls' argument regarding punitive damages is muddled. On the one hand, they
complain that punitive danmges were not alleged in the verified complaint. Yet on the other hand,
they concede LC. § 6-1604 precludes such a practice.
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Nonetheless, the Halls contend the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award them
attorney fees as the prevailing party on this unasserted claim for punitive damages. This argument
was never raised to the trial court to rule upon, so there is no basis to claim an abuse of discretion
by the trial court in addressing it.
Even had the Halls raised this issue to the district court, the trial court would have been
unable to award attorney fees to the Halls on this item for two reasons. First, punitive damages
are just that, they are an element of damage, and not a separate cause of action. Second, even if
they were interpreted to be a separate cause of action, a trial court would be hard pressed to hold
a party prevailed on an unasserted claim to sustain an award of attorney fees.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

The Halls are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Idaho Code section 12-121 provides
that a court may award reasonable attorney's fees in any civil action to the prevailing party when
the court is left with the abiding belief that the matter was brought, pursued, or defended
frivolously, umeasonably and without foundation. This is the same standard 'applied pursuant to
Rule 54. See Balderson v. Balderson, 127 Idaho 48, 54,896 P.2d 956,962 (1995) (quoting Minich
v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911,918,591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979).

The lrishes have not acted frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation in law or fact
in pursuing this appeal. Contrary to the Halls' assertion, this Coutt is not being asked to second
guess the trial cou1t and re-weight the evidence. .
Instead, the Irishes' appeal focuses upon a holding by the trial coutt which the Irishes
contend did not follow the applicable legal standard for a directed verdict. Namely, that the trial
court confused an ambiguous accusation of a crime, which is for the jury to decide, with a stated
opinion. This confusion is seen in the trail court's discussion of its decision where it recognized
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that the Irishes' interpretation of the statement "Dennis and Wanda Irish Stalking U2" as accusing
them of criminal activity was a reasonable inference to be drawn from the statement, and then
moved on from this conclusion to declare the statement was an opinion because it would be
impossible to prove or disprove whether the Irishes were stalking the Halls. Tr. Vol. II, p. 236, 1.

11 - p. 23 7, 1. 1. Proving whether an alleged criminal act has occurred is not impossible. It is this
contradiction in the trial court's logic in directing verdict which supported the appeal filed by the
Irishes. Raising this issue on appeal was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation in law
or fact.

CONCLUSION
The Irishes respectfully request this Court affirm the district court's denial of attorney fees
below, and deny the Halls attorney fees on appeal on their cross appeal.
---f,

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this o)L/_ - day of October, 2017.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

~<JC~Q~
SUSAN P. WEEKS
Attorneys for Appellants
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